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THE BETRAYAL OF McMAHON*
Constantine N. Katsoris**
The controversy over the awarding of punitive damages by arbi-
trators is not limited to securities disputes. Other industries, busi-
nesses and professions have also wrestled with the propriety and
effects of punitive damage awards. What makes securities arbitra-
tion somewhat unique, however, is that the vast majority of such
disputes are filed at Self Regulatory Organizations ("SROs"), such
'as the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), which are subject to the
oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
Some securities disputes are also filed at the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"), which is not subject to SEC oversight.
As a result, differing rules evolved for SRO arbitrations than
those applicable at the AAA. Indeed, before 1977, many differ-
ences also existed among the arbitration rules of the various SROs.
Accordingly, with SEC blessing, the Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration ("SICA") was created in 1977 to, inter alia,
bring uniformity to the SRO arbitration process.' Shortly after its
creation, SICA developed a Uniform Code of Arbitration ("Uni-
form Code" or "U.C. Arb."), which was adopted by all of the par-
ticipating SROs. Since then, SICA has met regularly and continues
to monitor the performance of SRO arbitration, amending the Uni-
form Code as the need arises. The SEC and the AAA, among
others, have been regularly invited guests at SICA meetings.
To a large extent, uniformity of SRO arbitration procedures has
been achieved. This uniformity, together with SICA's diversified
composition and open discussion of issues over the past twenty
* © 1997 Constantine N. Katsoris. This article will appear in the forthcoming
book ADR & THE LAW, published jointly by the American Arbitration Association,
the Fordham International Law Journal, and the Fordham Urban Law Journal.
** Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor of Law at Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. SICA presently consists of ten SROs, three public members, and the Securities
Industry Association (SIA). The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
See James E. Buck, Statement of the New York Stock Exchange Before the Securities
Exchange Commission Hearing on Release No. 34-12974, at 5 (Feb. 9, 1977) (on file
with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (testimony of the Secretary of the NYSE urg-
ing the creation of SICA). "[T]he Exchange does believe that the development of a
uniform system of arbitration to be used by the self-regulatory agencies would be in
the interest of investors and the securities industry." Id. at 3.
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years, has gone a long way towards dispelling mistrust and anxiety
on the part of public investors, the courts and regulators about the
fairness of the arbitration process.2 Unfortunately, recent events
threaten to undermine SICA's efforts toward maintaining uniform-
ity. One such divisive issue is the awardability of punitive damages
in arbitration.
The Garrity Prohibition
In 1976, the year before SICA was created, the New York Court
of Appeals rendered its decision (4-3) in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc.,3 which prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive dam-
ages, "even if agreed upon by the parties. ' ' 4 This decision took on
added significance because many pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments contained a New York choice of law clause,, regardless of
where the customer resided or the transaction took place. Initially,
however, the issue of punitive damages was not that pressing, be-
cause before 1987, arbitration was largely voluntary on the public's
part. That changed with the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,5 which upheld the enforce-
ability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements as to claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and forced most public customers
into arbitration. Thus, after McMahon, greater focus was placed
upon the Garrity decision, and its extra-territorial effect through
the use of a New York choice of law clause.
Indeed, because various restrictive conditions were beginning to
creep into pre-dispute securities arbitration agreements, in 1989
SICA amended §31(d) of its Uniform Code to prohibit any condi-
tion in pre-dispute arbitration agreements that "limits the ability of
arbitrators to make any award."'6 Despite that amendment, how-
ever, no SRO rule directly authorized punitive damages, whereas a
AAA rule specifically provided that arbitrators may award "any
2. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
419 (1989)[hereinafter Level Playing Field].
3. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. 1976).
4. 40 N.Y.2d at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
5. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Before McMahon, the prevailing view was that claims
under the 1934 Act could not be forced into arbitration partly because of the reserva-
tions expressed by the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan about the reliability of arbi-
tration. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration
After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 367-68 (1988).
6. EIGHTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRA-
TION 24 (June 1994) [hereinafter EIGHTH REPORT].
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remedy or relief which the arbitrators deem just and equitable and
within the scope of the agreement of the parties ...."I
In 1991 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Fahnestock v. Waltman,8 affirmed the dismissal of a punitive dam-
age award issued by a NYSE panel, noting that the result might
have been different if the NYSE's rules on arbitral authority were
as broad as the AAA's.9 In response to the Fahnestock reference
regarding arbitral authority, SICA added a new subdivision (h) to
section 28 of the Uniform Code which provided that arbitrators
could grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrators "deem just
and equitable and that would have been available in a court with
jurisdiction over the matter."'1 Unfortunately, no SRO board ap-
proved this change, largely due to the strong lobbying of the Secur-
ities Industry Association ("SIA").
Predictably, the turmoil over punitive damages continued in the
courts. In 1994, both the NYSE and the NASD announced plans to
address this and other troublesome issues facing SRO arbitrations.
The NYSE held a two-day symposium where these issues were
openly debated by a wide spectrum of leading experts in the field
and, based upon such discussions, issued recommendations in the
form of a Report."
The NASD also sought to calm the troubled waters, but in a dif-
ferent way. In the Fall of 1994, the NASD announced the forma-
tion of its own Arbitration Task Force ("Ruder Committee" or
"Task Force") to explore and propose broad reforms to the arbitra-
tion process, including the contentious issue of punitive damages.'2
7. American Arbitration Association Securities Rule 45 (1997).
8. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
9. id. at 519.
10. EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
11. See Symposium, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in
the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAm L. REV. 1495, 1507-08 (1995) [hereinafter NYSE
SyMposiuM]. The NYSE Symposium was held in the Fall of 1994. On May 30, 1995,
the NYSE issued a Report thereon which listed recommendations and conclusions
[hereinafter NYSE REPORT]. As to comments in response to the issues raised by the
NYSE Report, see Robert S. Clemente, Director of Arbitration at the NYSE, Re-
marks at Seminar, entitled Securities Arbitration and Litigation: The Changing Land-
scape (New York, N.Y., Apr. 29, 1996)(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
12. The Ruder Committee was headed by Professor David S. Ruder, former
Chairman of the' SEC, and included distinguished practitioners and academics, most
of whom had a background in the securities industry. Of the eight Task Force mem-
bers, one represented investors, two were senior executives at brokerage firms, and
three were lawyers in firms representing brokerage firms. See Scot J. Paltrow, NASD
Panel Calls For Big Changes in Arbitration of Investor Disputes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1996, at 1.
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The practical effect of this action by the NASD was to preclude
SICA from seeking a solution to the punitive damage maze, be-
cause of the NASD's position to defer further discussion of this
issue at SICA pending the issuance of its Task Force's findings.
Intervention of Mastrobuono
In 1995 the Supreme Court decided Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc.13 Mastrobuono involved a punitive damage
award by a NASD panel under an arbitration agreement which
contained two seemingly inconsistent clauses: a New York choice-
of-law provision and a clause broadly relegating any controversy
between the parties to arbitration.14 Neither of these clauses re-
ferred to punitive damages. In reversing the lower courts, the
Supreme Court allowed the punitive award to stand, noting that
the two controversial clauses created an ambiguity as to the par-
ties' intent about punitive damages; and, relying on a rule of con-
tract interpretation, reasoned that where an ambiguity exists, it will
be construed against the party that drafted it, in this case
Shearson. 15
The SEC, in its amicus brief in Mastrobuono urged the Supreme
Court to clarify the effect of §31(d) of the Uniform Code (Rule
21(f)(4) of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice) prohibiting any con-
dition in arbitration agreements that "limits the ability of the arbi-
trators to make any award."16 The Court, however, avoided the
issue by noting that the agreement in Mastrobuono was signed in
1985, long before the 1989 amendment to §31, but also acknowl-
edged that, absent any ambiguities, the parties can agree to restrict
punitive damages.17
What, therefore, would prevent counsel for the securities indus-
try from tightening their brokerage agreements by adding language
prohibiting punitive damages? Such a unilateral insertion into
what is already a contract of adhesion 18 would hardly constitute the
free and willing consent on the part of the investing public intended
13. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
14. Id. at 1214.
15. Id. at 1219.
16. Id. at 1218 n.6.
17. Id. at 1216.
18. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The
Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, at 593-96 (1991) [hereinafter
Tower of Babel]. See also Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue,
N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at 1 (discussing how the increased use. of arbitration agree-
ments in various types of businesses deprives the public of its right to sue).
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by Mastrobuono. Furthermore, any such amendments seeking to
restrict an arbitrator's power to grant punitive damages are sure to
run afoul of the clear language of §31(d) of the Uniform Code
which prohibits limiting "the ability of arbitrators to make any
award". 19
In the fall of 1996 the New York Appellate Division, First De-
partment, in Mulder v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette,2° citing Mas-
trobuono, set the stage for a new era by lifting the Garrity
prohibition against arbitrators awarding punitive damages. Thus,
unless the parties have clearly and freely agreed otherwise, punitive
damages are broadly awardable in arbitration, subject to appropri-
ate state restrictions, if any.
The Ruder Committee Recommendations
In early 1996, the Ruder Committee, whose meetings and delib-
erations were shrouded in secrecy, issued its report ("Ruder Re-
port") which was over 150 pages in length and contained scores of
recommendations-most of which are quite constructive.2 1 Unfor-
tunately, the two most significant recommendations-(i) the impo-
sition of a cap on punitive damages of two times compensatory
damages, or $750,000, whichever is less (rigid cap rule); and, (ii) the
elimination of the so-called six year rule 2 2-met with significant
19. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also joint NASD/NYSE Informa-
tion Memo/Notice to Members 95-16, which advised their members that they may not
include provisions in customer agreements which can be construed as restricting or
limiting the ability of customers to arbitrate or arbitrators' powers to issue awards (on
file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
20. 224 A.D.2d 125, 648 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). See also R.C. Layne
Construction, Inc. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 651 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(upholding a punitive damages award in a securities arbitration); Constantine N. Kat-
soris, Mastrobuono Not the Last Word on Punitives, 13 ALTERNATIVES 144 (Nov.
1995).
21. SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY
TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURI-
TIES DEALERS, INC. (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter RUDER REPORT].
22. The so-called six year rule stems from Section 4 of the Uniform Code of Arbi-
tration and it sets a six year time limitation for the submission of a claim to arbitration
from the time of the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim. EIGHTH REPORT,
supra note 6, at 9. It was never intended as a bar to the claim in court and was
inserted merely as a matter of administrative convenience at a time when: (i) arbitra-
tion was, basically voluntary on the public's part; (ii) there were no formal discovery
rules; and, (iii) limited partnerships, which have been the subject of much litigation
since the late 1980's were not contemplated. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 11, at
1534. Unfortunately, some courts have interpreted the six year rule as barring such
claims. Id. To solve this misunderstanding, SICA, on July 12, 1996, unanimously
agreed to a bright line test as to when the six year period began; and, if the claim was
not eligible for submission to arbitration, it would survive to be heard in court. See
19971 225
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opposition at SICA and elsewhere, including all of the Public
Members of SICA.23
At a meeting on January 28, 1997, the Board of Governors of the
NASD approved, in concept, an amendment regarding the six year
rule that more resembled the solution agreed to at SICA than the
Ruder Committee's recommendation;24 and, for this, the NASD
Board of Governors is to be commended. Unfortunately, however,
despite significant opposition, the NASD Board of Governors con-
tinued to press for the rigid cap rule.25 By way of comparison, no
other SRO, nor the AAA has placed or (to this author's knowl-
edge) is considering a similar cap on punitive damages.26 Even the
NASD's timing is awkward, seeking to impose this restriction on
the public after the Mastrobuono and Mulder cases clearly sanc-
tioned the public's right to receive punitive damages in arbitration.
From the investor's point of view, a rigid limit of $750,000 must
be rejected out of hand, since it is totally inadequate in situations
Proposal to SICA by Paul Dubow, Esq. (SIA representative at SICA) and Tom
Grady, Esq. (Public Member at SICA) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Jour-
nal). On the other hand, the Ruder Committee recommended eliminating the six
year rule altogether (which by itself is favorable to the public), but only in exchange
for other restrictions that are detrimental to the public. Unfortunately, the Ruder
Committee's recommended elimination of this troublesome rule was tied to a pot-
pourri of conditions that, in the aggregate, are far more burdensome than the six year
rule itself, namely: (i) that arbitrators be required to apply the law of statutes of limi-
tation; (ii) that arbitrators write reasoned decisions on statute of limitation issues;
(iii) the imposition of an elaborate early disposition motion practice on statute of
limitation issues which could be used to harass investors; and, (iv) encouraging that
these motions be decided on the papers. RUDER REPORT, supra note 21, at 22-33.
See also Constantine N. Katsoris, Ruder Report is a Delicate Compromise, 14 ALTER-
NATIVES 29 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter Delicate Compromise].
23. The opposition by the Public Members has been expressed to the NASD on
numerous occasions, including: (i) the SICA meeting held at Fordham Law School on
February 8, 1996; (ii) at the special SICA meeting held at the NASD on November 8,
1996; and, (iii) in a joint letter on December 9, 1996 to Chairman Daniel P. Tully, of
the Board of Governors of the NASD (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
See also Reactions to Ruder Report, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, March, 1996, at 1;
PIABA Conference: Ruder Commission Issues, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Nov. 1996,
at 1; Thomas J. Stipanowich, NASD Should Reconsider Its Punitive Cap, 15 ALTER-
NATIVES 13 (Feb. 1997).
24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See also Stock Regulators Recon-
sider Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at 8; NASD Acts On Key Arbitration Proposals
Concerning Punitive Damages, Eligibility, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 124 (Jan. 31, 1997);
NASD Parent Board Turns to SICA-Modified Version of the Six-Year Eligibility Rule,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1997, at 4 [hereinafter SICA-Modifled Version].
25. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. See also NASD Parent Board
Ratifies Punitive Caps Proposal, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1997, at 4 [hereinaf-
ter Punitive Caps Proposal].
26. See Katsoris, Delicate Compromise, supra note 22, at 29.
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involving large compensatory awards. In this regard, the rigid cap
rule is unlike the tort reform bill enacted last year in Congress-
and rejected by the President-in that said tort reform bill did not
have an arbitrary rigid ceiling, but rather sought to impose a flexi-
ble punitive damage limit of $250,000 or two times compensatory
damages, whichever is greater.2 7 The Task Force seeks to justify its
two tiered cap, whichever is lower, saying that it "will protect bro-
ker-dealers from 'runaway' awards that have no relationship to
compensatory damages. "28 Yet, the Task Force fails to apply that
same standard to its own proposed remedy. For example, what re-
lationship does a $750,000 punitive damage award have to a $20
million compensatory award? To impose an arbitrary cap on puni-
tive damages in arbitration which bears no relationship to the in-
jury inflicted and which is not similarly imposed in court condones
unconscionable conduct and relegates arbitration to a second class
forum-a result never intended by McMahon.
It has also been suggested that the Ruder Report is a mosaic of
compromised remedies, delicately balanced by the Task Force to
forge consensus in resolving the many differing problems prevalent
in SRO arbitration, and that a challenge to any of the parts would
destroy the cohesiveness of this mosaic. 29 Indeed, it has more re-
cently been suggested that the two most significant and controver-
sial issues covered by the Ruder Report-the six year rule and the
punitive damage cap-were paired against each other. "We be-
lieve the compromise we have finally gotten goes part way to satis-
fying both of our constituencies-investors and member firms ....
[I]t does not give either side everything they want. '30 In point of
fact, neither of the Ruder Committee's recommendations involving
the six year rule or the cap on punitive damages favor the public.
Not only should the six year rule never have been enacted, but the
27. See Neil A. Lewis, Democrat is Disputing President on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1996, at D23. Interestingly, a recently sponsored products liability bill pro-
poses to cap punitive damages at either $250,000 or two times compensatory damages,
depending on the size of the business defendant; however, because the American Bar
Association "does not support broad federal products liability legislation, it will op-
pose the new bill." See Kenneth Jost, Tort Issues Resurrected, ABA JOURNAL, March
1997, at 18.
28. See RUDER REPORT, supra note 21, at 43 (emphasis added).
29. See Katsoris, Delicate Compromise, supra note 22, at 29. See also Leslie Ea-
ton, Arbitration Rules Would Give Some, Take Some, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at 3
[hereinafter Eaton].
30. Brett D. Fromson, NASD Alters Arbitration System; Proposal Caps Punitive
Damages, Lowers Barriers to Investor Suits, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at D3 (quot-
ing statement of Linda Feinberg, Esq., executive Vice-President of NASD
Regulations).
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solution to its dilemma was resolved by consensus within SICA it-
self, whereas the NASD's rigid cap rule clearly favors the indus-
try,3' so where is the quid pro quo? Moreover, assuming arguendo
that there is quid pro quo, it is hardly justifiable to suggest to some-
one who has filed a timely claim in arbitration-regarding a devas-
tating loss suffered by the outrageous, unethical and fraudulent
conduct of an unscrupulous broker or firm-that their claim for
punitive damages was bargained away by a task force eager to
solve a totally unrelated issue regarding tardily filed claims.
In any event, even if the SEC approved the rigid cap rule in a
19b filing by the NASD,32 there is a serious question whether such
a rule has validity and would be enforceable. Simply put, where is
the legislative authorization to deprive an investor of relief other-
wise available in court? 33
31. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. See also SICA-Modified Ver-
sion, supra note 24, at 4; Punitive Caps Proposal, supra note 25, at 4.
32. Under § 19(b) of the 1934 Act, each SRO shall file with the SEC any proposed
rule or change in the rules of such self-regulatory organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Moreover, no such "proposed rule change shall take effect
unless approved by the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the
provisions of this subsection." Id.
33. The inquiry will revolve around the Congressional delegation of authority to
the SEC regarding securities arbitration and related federal and state issues. See 15
U.S.C. §78s(b)(i) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). Authorizing the SEC to approve all SRO
rule changes in arbitration is hardly a legislative mandate to involuntarily strip a
claimant of relief otherwise available in court. Indeed, in the Prudential global settle-
ment with the SEC, two important rights were waived: the respondent could not as-
sert a defense of statute of limitations and the claimant could not claim punitive
damages; but, participating in the procedure was optional. Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Prudential Sec. Inc., C.A. No. 93-2164, 1993 WL 473189 (D.D.C. Oct.
21, 1993) Fourth Quarterly Report of Claims Administrator. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 11, at 1575. Proponents of the rigid cap rule point to the $300,000 limit
imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) as support for the rigid cap rule. RUDER RE-
PORT, supra note 21, at 43. Congressional enactment of such a statutory limit, how-
ever, has a narrow and specific application within the framework of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. It hardly constitutes
Congressional authorization to the NASD to enact caps on its own initiative. More-
over, the rigid cap rule itself violates that very same Congressional statutory limit of
$300,000 by limiting punitive awards to two times compensatory damages. See Mar-
key Seeks Review on Mandatory Arbitration, WALL STREET LETTER, Feb. 10, 1997, at
10 [hereinafter Markey]. Still others have argued that the ability to collect punitive
damages is not a "right" of the claimant, for it is rather intended to punish the wrong-
doer; accordingly, the NASD can restrict this so-called right. To carry such an argu-
ment to its logical conclusion the NASD, absent enabling legislation, would have the
power to restrict RICO (treble damages) or any other federally mandated multi-dam-
age statute merely by amending its rules-a result hardly contemplated by the
Supreme Court in McMahon. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., No. 96-7042,
1997 WL 51684 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1997). In upholding the enforceability of condi-
tions of employment requiring individuals to arbitrate claims resting on statutory
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The Covenant of McMahon
The conventional wisdom underlying the broad embracement of
arbitration by the Supreme Court in McMahon was an investor's
ability to obtain in arbitration whatever relief was available in
court.34 The Ruder Report's rigid cap rule clearly violates that
mandate. Furthermore, such a unilateral imposition by an SRO of
a rigid cap will undermine the public's perception of the fairness of
SRO arbitration, and return us to pre-SICA days, when many sug-
gested that the process was stacked against the public investor.35
rights, the Court of Appeals in Cole emphasized that "'[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' Id. at
*15 (citing Rodgiguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989)). In any event, adoption of the rigid cap rule by the NASD will surely be
challenged in the courts. See also Deborah Lohse, NASD Rule for Damages Is Criti-
cized, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1997, at C1.
34. See Eaton, supra note 29, at 3 (statement of Linda Feinberg, Esq., reporter to
Ruder Committee). "The new rules are supposed to make sure investors can get in
arbitration what they can get in court." Id. See also NYSE SYMPosIUM, supra note
11, at 1532. "Limitations on what arbitrators can do that are not parallel to what
judges can do would be hostile to arbitration as a full alterative dispute resolution
system." Id. (statement of Catherine McGuire, Esq., Chief Counsel, Market Regula-
tion of the SEC). In addition, "[the FAA] prohibits enforcement of a contractual
provision that limits remedies available to customers if the remedies are available in
court." Id. at 1584. "The way arbitration was sold to both the Supreme Court and the
SEC was that essentially you have the same rights in arbitration as you would have in
court." Id. at 1523 (statement of Boyd Page, Esq. one of the members of the Ruder
Committee). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-26805, 43 SEC Docket
1417, 1427 (1989) "Agreements cannot be used to curtail any rights that a party may
otherwise have in a judicial forum. If punitive damages, or attorneys' fees would be
available under applicable law, then the agreement cannot limit parties' rights to re-
quest them, nor arbitrators' rights to award them." Id. See also U.C. Arb. § 31(d),
EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (prohibiting any condition in pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements that "limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any award"). See
also U.C. Arb. § 28(h), EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 (providing that arbitra-
tors could grant "any remedy or relief that the arbitrators deem just and equitable
and that would have been available in a court with jurisdiction over the matter").
35. See Shearson American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243
(1987)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). "As even the most ardent supporter of arbitration
would recognize, the arbitral process at best places the investor on an equal footing
with the securities-industry personnel against whom the claims are brought. Further-
more, there remains the danger that, at worst, compelling an investor to arbitrate
securities claims puts him in a forum controlled by the securities industry. This result
directly contradicts the goal of both securities Acts to free the investor from the con-
trol of the market professionals. The Uniform Code provides some safeguards but
despite them, and indeed because of the background of the arbitrators, the investor
has the impression, frequently justified, that his claims are being judged by a forum
composed of individuals sympathetic to the securities industry and not drawn from
the public." Id. at 260-61. "The uniform opposition of investors to compelled arbitra-
tion and the overwhelming support of the securities industry for the process suggest
1997]
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In the final analysis, such a rigid cap will be questioned by a jus-
tifiably suspicious public who will ask the obvious question: why is
this restriction being imposed at an SRO forum and not at forums
such as the AAA, where there is no punitive damage cap whatso-
ever? This inquiry takes on added significance when one considers
that despite concerted efforts by the SEC, the SIA and SICA to
insert the AAA as an alternate forum in securities arbitration
agreements, the industry has ignored that plea, thus largely exclud-
ing the less restrictive AAA as an alternate forum.36
Alternative Solutions
If the industry fears large punitive damage awards in arbitration
(even when punitives reasonably relate to compensatory damages),
then perhaps claims involving punitive damages of more than
$750,000 should be removed from arbitration, either automatically
or at the option of the respondent, and the entire matter returned
to the courts where the parties have the procedural safeguard of an
appeal more readily available.37
Another possible solution would be to set a threshold amount for
punitive damages in arbitration. If a panel exceeded the threshold
amount the respondent would have the option to appeal the puni-
tive award under an SRO appellate procedure before it became a
final award, unless the claimant agreed to accept the threshold
amount. Thus, the threshold amount would not be a cap, as recom-
mended by the Ruder Report; instead, it would become a trigger
for an appeal, with the cost of the appeal being borne by the
respondent.
that there must be some truth to the investors' belief that the securities industry has
an advantage in a forum under its own control." Id. at 261 (citing William Glaberson,
When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, at 8, quoting Sheldon H.
Elsen, Chairman, American Bar Association Task Force on Securities Arbitration:
"The houses basically like the present system because they own the stacked deck.")
Id.
36. At one point, the SEC, SICA and the SIA all endorsed the suggestion that the
AAA be included as an alternative forum in brokerage account pre-dispute agree-
ments. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 483, 525 (1996) [hereinafter SICA]. Such a suggestion, however, has little
chance of adoption because of the securities industry's certain opposition to the
AAA's lack of either a punitive damage cap or a six year rule.
37. It would be preferable to remove the entire case to court when punitive dam-
ages in excess of $750,000 are pleaded so as to avoid bifurcated proceedings-i.e., the
compensatory damages phase tried in arbitration and the punitive phase tried in
court. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 3 (1986).
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The suggestion that punitive damage awards in securities arbitra-
tion be appealable is not a new concept,38 and such an alternative
solution was presented to SICA at its January 17, 1997 meeting in
Los Angeles.39 Unfortunately, because of enormous industry pres-
sure outside of SICA, this suggestion has been stalled.4 ° Indeed, so
long as the NASD continues to dangle a rigid cap rule, there is no
incentive for the SIA to seek reasonable alternatives.
Conclusion
Either of these alternative solutions-removal to court where
punitive damages are pleaded in excess of $750,000, or an internal
SRO appeal (where punitive damages are awarded in excess of the
trigger amount)-would avoid the objections posed by a
mandatory rigid cap suggested by the Ruder Report,4' while still
affording a reasonable measure of protection for the securities in-
dustry. Most important, however, is that neither of these alterna-
tive solutions would violate the covenant that a public investor
receive the same relief in arbitration as is available in court,42 albeit
under different procedures. It is rather puzzling why the NASD
has adopted an inflexible Maginot Line43 mentality as to the rigid
cap rule. It is even more puzzling why the SEC would even con-
sider approving the rigid cap rule in a 19b filing.
38. See Katsoris, Tower of Babel, supra note 18, at 599-600. Presumably, the ap-
pellate process could instead go through the courts, but that approach would no doubt
require an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 11, at 1669.
39. See Joint Memorandum presented to SICA by Professors Thomas J. Stipa-
nowich and Constantine N. Katsoris, Public Members at SICA (Jan. 7, 1997)(on file
with the Fordham Urban Law Journal). At the SICA meeting on November 8, 1996, a
subcommittee (including the two aforementioned Public Members) was appointed to
draft alternative solutions to the punitive damage dilemma. Numerous other sugges-
tions were also considered by the subcommittee, such as a de novo retrial on the
punitive issue in court if the punitive damage award in arbitration exceeded a certain
amount; however, such suggestions were rejected as being more burdensome than the
SRO appeal process. See also Saika v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d. 922, 927 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that a clause in a doctor-patient agreement providing for a trial de
novo in court in the event an arbitration award exceeded $25,000 was unenforceable
against a patient for public policy reasons). The attractiveness of the internal appeal
process is that it provides the industry with an additional measure of protection from
a runaway punitive award, yet preserves the rights of claimants to obtain relief similar
to what is available in court.
40. See Mana Lumumba-Kasongo, Punitive Damages Compromise Lands on
Scrapheap, WALL STREET LETrER, Jan. 20, 1997, at 1.
41. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 29-31 and accompanying text.
43. The Maginot Line was a mighty system of fixed fortifications along the eastern
frontier of France. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1658 (5th ed. 1993).
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Many of the Ruder Report recommendations-i.e., a list selec-
tion process where the parties choose the arbitrators from a desig-
nated list instead of having the arbitrators selected by the SRO-
do not require uniformity among the SRO's. As to a cap on puni-
tive damages, however, uniformity among the SRO's is required;
otherwise, it would lead to extensive and often confusing forum
shopping. With this in mind, if the NASD rigid cap rule is ap-
proved by the SEC, will the SEC then press for uniformity among
the SROs on this point?44 Should that happen, it would establish a
dangerous precedent whereby the NASD unilaterally changes the
rules, and the other SROs are expected to follow. 45
Such a scenario of following the first SRO to file is hardly reas-
suring to the investing public no matter how well meaning; for,
what other "directives" can the public expect in the future from the
Ruder Committee, or any other SRO appointed task force or com-
mittee? Moreover, it would surely lead to the demise of SICA,
which would be most unfortunate,46 because it was SICA that
44. Indeed, the Ruder Report itself suggests that its recommendations "will be
most effective if applied uniformly and consistently by all self-regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs) that offer arbitration forums." RUDER REPORT, supra note 21, at 1.
45. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 11 (statement of Catherine McGuire, Esq.,
Chief Counsel, Market Regulation of the SEC). "SROs are dominated by industry. I
don't mean their staffs. I think the New York Stock Exchange has a board half public,
half not public. The NASD's board, however, is more largely dominated, so any rules
they adopt may reflect or appear to reflect, their affiliation with industry, which is
usually in the defense position. I think this is not where I would start a laboratory for
tort reform. I don't think it would be perceived as balanced." Id. at 1592. See also
Katsoris, SICA, supra note 36, at 534. "From time to time, it has been suggested that,
because the Uniform Code has been extensively updated since McMahon, SICA's
role has diminished, implying that like old soldiers, it should fade away. The scenario
then suggests, in the interest of uniformity and economy, that all the SROs collapse
their public arbitration programs into one, leaving the public securities arbitration
function solely to the NASD. This suggestion is ludicrous because SROs by their very
makeup, presently lack the structural independence necessary to insure public confi-
dence. Indeed, as the arbitrable issues expand (i.e., employment issues), and as the
stakes grow (i.e., larger compensatory awards and punitive damages issues), the pub-
lic will increasingly demand that the rules of battle be set by a truly independent
group." Id. at 534.
46. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: Does the Bell Toll for Thee?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1994, at 1. Under the present system, SICA, an independent
body, proposes rule changes. The SRO boards approve and file them with the SEC.
The SEC then decides what the rule will be. By that time, all participants have had at
least two bites at the apple: the public at the SICA level, and at the 19(b) filing; the
various SROs at the SICA level, and at their board's level; the industry at the SICA
level, at the SRO level (where it lobbies intensely), and again at the 19(b) filing; and,
the SEC at the SICA level (where SEC representatives and others are invited guests),
and as the final word at the 19(b) filing. See generally Katsoris, SICA, supra note 36.
This pattern for rule changes in securities arbitration should be preserved. As an
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helped eliminate the widespread distrust of arbitration on the part
of the public, the legislatures and the courts.47 In many ways,
SICA can be compared to the Financial Accounting Standards
Board48 in that: both were born out of crisis; both have been in-
dependent; both involve SEC oversight or participation; and, both
are a buffer between the investing public on the one hand and the
securities or business community on the other. 9 SICA cannot be
replaced by the SIA, or PIABA (the claimants' bar),50 or any of the
SROs or their committees, or any combination thereof, for each
basically has its own special interests or constituencies to serve.
independent body, SICA establishes and maintains a level playing field. Its presence,
like a cop on the beat these past 20 years, has been reassuring to regulators, the
courts, and the investing public.
47. In 1953, the United States Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan-expressing some
mistrust of arbitration-concluded that pre-dispute arbitration agreements would not
be enforceable as to issues arising under the Securities Act of 1933. 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953). In 1976 the New York Court of Appeals in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., expres-
sing similar distrust of arbitration, held that arbitrators lacked authority to award pu-
nitive damages. 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1976). SICA was created in 1977. It is
noteworthy that in 1987 the majority opinion in McMahon reflected upon the previ-
ous mistrust of arbitration as follows: "[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the
basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitra-
tion that has prevailed since that time. This is expressly so in light of the intervening
changes in the regulatory structure of the securities laws." 482 U.S. 220, 223 (emphasis
added). Similarly, in a dissenting opinion in McMahon, Justice Blackmun observed
that "[ilt is true that arbitration procedures in the securities industry have improved
since Wilko's day. Of particular importance has been the development of a code of
arbitration by the Commission with the assistance of representatives of the securities
industry and the public." Id. at 258. Moreover, Justice Blackmun reasoned that:
This code has been used to harmonize the arbitration procedure among the
SROs. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dis-
pute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 283-384 (1984). As the Commission ex-
plained: [T]his [Code] marks a substantial improvement over the various
arbitration procedures currently being utilized by the securities industry and
represents an important step towards establishing a uniform system for
resolving investor complaints through arbitration.
Id. at 258 n.16 (emphasis added). It is respectfully suggested that the single most
important intervening event bridging the mistrust of arbitration expressed by both
Wilko and Garrity, and the subsequent confidence evidenced in McMahon was the
creation of SICA in 1977.
48. The Financial Accounting Standards Board is responsible for formulating the
rules by which companies account and report their financial condition. See HORN-
GREN, INTRODucTION TO FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 57-58 (1984).
49. See Katsoris, Level Playing Field, supra note 2, at 476.
50. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association ("PIABA") is an association
of attorneys representing investors and others in the resolution of their claims against
the securities industry.
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SICA on the other hand has been a melting pot of special interests,
and that is why it has commanded widespread credibility.5'
Arbitration was not intended to be used as a Trojan Horse from
which to deny relief otherwise available in court. 2 That was not
the foundation upon which McMahon was decided. If brokerage
agreements force the public investor into SRO arbitration with an
arbitrary cap on punitive damages imposed by the very same SRO
at which the hearing is held, then we have arrived at the point
where, in reality, the fox is guarding the henhouse; and, the time
has come to revisit the issue of whether securities arbitration
should once again become voluntary, as it was before McMahon.53
Accordingly, in view of the fact that it bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to compensatory damages, 54 its unilateral imposition by an
SRO subjects it to questionable validity,55 it is strongly opposed by
the public,5 6 it is not imposed at the AAA or at the other SRO
arbitration forums,5 7 it violates §31 of the Uniform Code,5 8 it but-
tresses the argument that the pre-dispute arbitration agreement has
become an unenforceable contract of adhesion,5 9 it rekindles public
distrust of the SRO arbitration process,60 it violates the spirit under
which McMahon was decided,61 and there are less objectionable
ways to solve the securities industry's fears of a runaway punitive
award,62 the rigid cap rule must be rejected.
51. An example of SICA's independence was evident regarding the thorny issue
of non-attorney representation-a subject largely avoided by many bar associations.
Despite some unfavorable publicity and pressure, SICA did not hesitate to seek a
solution. It held meetings at both ends of the country, openly solicited comments, and
finally wrote a well respected report which was published and widely distributed. See
Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration on Representation of Par-
ties in Arbitration by Non-Attorneys, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503 (1995).
52. See Katsoris, Tower of Babel, supra note 18, at 593-96.
53. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 1113, 1147 (1993). Moreover, such a restriction on arbitral authority would itself
violate U.C. ARB. § 31(d) which prohibits arbitration agreements that limit "the abil-
ity of the arbitrators to make any award." See EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
See also Markey, supra note 33, at 10.
54. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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